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Can earnings manipulation create value?
Abstract. A recent wave of scandals in the corporate world has raised
heated debates regarding the manipulation of earnings by rms insiders.
Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation to be a negative
social phenomenon and suggests measures for its elimination. In the present
paper, we argue that earnings manipulation can be a part of the equilibrium
relationships between rmsinsiders and outsiders. We consider an optimal
contract between an entrepreneur and an investor where the entrepreneur
is subject to a double moral hazard problem (one being the choice of pro-
duction e¤ort and the other being intertemporal substitution, which consists
of transferring cash ows between periods). Investment and production ef-
fort may be below socially optimal levels because the entrepreneur cannot
entirely capture the results of his e¤ort. The opportunity to manipulate
earnings protects the entrepreneur against the risk of a low payo¤ when the
results of production are low. Ex-ante, this provides an incentive for the
entrepreneur to increase his level of e¤ort and invest e¢ ciently.
Key words: earnings manipulation, intertemporal substitution, design of
securities, property rights, moral hazard
JEL classication codes: G32, D92, D82
2
1 Introduction.
A recent wave of scandals in the corporate world (Worldcom, Enron, Nortel
etc.) has raised heated debates regarding the manipulation of earnings by
rmsinsiders. Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation
(hereafter EM) to be a negative social phenomenon and suggests measures for
its elimination. In the present paper, we argue that earnings manipulation
can be a part of the equilibrium relationships between rms insiders and
outsiders.
In contrast to earnings being misreported, which in most cases represents
accounting fraud,1 we consider EM to be a transfer of funds between peri-
ods. This transfer does not create any social value (in contrast to productive
e¤ort). Some typical examples include delaying the approval of important
decisions, ine¢ cient investments, borrowing in order to manipulate nancial
results, ine¢ cient discount policy etc.2 EM is well documented in empirical
literature. For instance, Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) discovered
discontinuities in the distribution of corporate earnings at some specic val-
ues (thresholds). The number of reports with earnings just below the thresh-
old is much lower than those just above the threshold. This suggests that
insiders are involved in earnings manipulation around the threshold level.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) show that 30-44% of rms with small pre-
managed losses manage earnings to create a positive prot. Recently, Yu,
Du, and Sun (2004) examined earnings management by Chinese rms and
found earnings manipulation around two thresholds.
Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) also present a theoretical model
involving EM by a manager with a bonus-like contract. The authors show
that the managers incentive to manipulate earnings depends on the values of
the latent (pre-managed) earnings, the managers bonus, and the magnitude
1For emipirical evidence about earnings misreporting see Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney
(1996) and Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2003). For theoretical papers see Cornelli and
Yoscha (2003), Crocker and Slemrod (2005) and Johnsen and Talley (2005).
2Other examples include the choice of inventory methods, allowance for bad debt, ex-
pensing of research and development, recognition of sales not yet shipped, estimation of
pension liabilities, capitalization of leases and marketing expenses, and delay in main-
tenance expenditures (see Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999). Roychowdhury (2006)
provides extensive evidence on earnings management through real activities manipulation.
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of the social loss from EM. The managers decision also relies on whether
predictions of future prots are certain or risky. In contrast, the model in
the present paper contains a double-moral hazard problem (one being the
choice of production e¤ort and the other being the EM decision). Second,
we compare di¤erent contractual arrangements between an investor and an
entrepreneur as well as their impact on the entrepreneurs e¤ort. This is
important given that several recent papers analyze the links between nanc-
ing structures and EM (see, for instance, Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2007),
Hodgson and Stevenson (2000) and Jensen (2002)). Finally, we compare the
models predictions with EM and without EM.
We analyze a model where a rm needs external nancing. The rms
value consists of current (rst-period) earnings and the going concern value.
In contrast to current earnings, it is costly to verify the going concern value
of the rm and enforce payments contingent on it (for instance, since it
is impossible to describe all states of nature in the future and all optimal
actions, the rms owners may be able to divert all future earnings to their
own pockets).3 The fact that it is impossible to write a complete contract
contingent on the rms going concern value eliminates any opportunity to
write a contract contingent on the rms total value (which would eliminate
the problem of EM because EM cannot increase the rms total value). The
nancing contract includes cash payments and an allocation of rights on the
rms going concern value - both being contingent on the magnitude of the
rms current earnings.4 The contract may optimize the value of the parties
cooperation because of the impact it has on the entrepreneurs incentives to
provide productive e¤ort and engage in EM. For instance, if the going concern
value represents a new rm and the party responsible for decision-making is
the sole owner of this new rm, this party will be interested in shifting the
value of the original business to the new rm (even if it is socially ine¢ cient).
As mentioned above, we compare two situations. In the rst, the entrepre-
neur chooses only a costly productive e¤ort - assuming that the entrepreneur
cannot be involved in EM. In the second, the entrepreneur is subject to a
double-moral hazard problem which includes the choice of productive e¤ort
and the EM decision. It is shown that the entrepreneurs productive e¤ort
may be higher in the second case. The following demonstrates the intuitions
3Based on incomplete contracts literature (see, for example, Hart (1995)).
4See, among others, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) for contingencies in nancing con-
tracts.
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behind this result. Consider debt nancing. If current earnings are below the
face value of debt, the rm is bankrupt and the entrepreneur gets nothing. If
the amount of investment is relatively high, the debt face value should also
be high. When the face value of debt is higher than the maximal value of
current earnings, the entrepreneur receives nothing regardless of the e¤ort
provided. However, if he is able to transfer earnings between periods and the
rms going concern value is relatively high, the entrepreneur can increase
current earnings by reducing the rms going concern value. This allows the
rm to avoid bankruptcy and make a positive prot. This in turn increases
his ex-ante incentive to provide productive e¤ort. This argument works even
if the cost of intertemporal substitution is relatively high.
Note that recent scandals have caused many authors to believe that linear
contracts are the best contracts for managers (entrepreneurs) because they
protect the rm against EM (see, for instance, Jensen, 2003). The main
problem is that such contracts are not optimal if the entrepreneur is subject
to moral hazard with regard to the choice of productive e¤ort (Innes, 1990).
However, Jensen (2003) argues that the benets from non-linear contracts
cannot be compared to the disadvantages of EM. This paper argues that
non-linear contracts, including standard debt, can be better in both senses.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
model; Section 3 explains optimal contracting without EM; Section 4 dis-
cusses optimal contracting when the entrepreneur is subject to a double
moral hazard problem which includes EM. A comparison of the outcomes
is presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the models implications with
regard to empirical evidence and Section 7 presents the conclusions.
2 Model.
Consider a rm that has to make an investment b > 0. The rms owner/entrepreneur
(E) needs external nancing from an outside investor (I). E and I are risk
neutral. If the investment is made, the rms performance depends on Es
e¤ort e 2 [0; 1]. The cost of e¤ort is e2. The interim rst-period cash ow
r0 equals 1 with probability e and 0 otherwise. The companys assets which
remain at the end of rst period may yield the revenue 2 in the second pe-
riod.5 E may engage in EM. The rms nal rst-period prot is r = r0  a,
5For simplicity it is assumed that the rms going concern value does not depend on e.
The model can easily be generalized by allowing this. As far as we can see, no intuitions
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where a is a prot correction arising from intertemporal substitution (EM
takes place if a 6= 0). If a 6= 0, the rms going concern value at the end of
rst period is thus v = 2+ a  c, where c is the cost of EM, 0 < c < 2.6 EM
is socially ine¢ cient (a = 0, where a denotes the socially optimal a). To
insure that earnings are non-negative in each period we assume
c  2  a  r0 (1)
E observes r0 and chooses a. I cannot observe e and a. The rst-best level
of e¤ort e maximizes the rms expected value to the entrepreneur. The
expected value can be written as E[r+v e2  b] = e+2 e2  b. Obviously,
e = 1=2. We assume that the projects net present value is positive, i. e.
Ee=1=2;a=0[r + v   e2] = 9=4 > b (2)
A complete contract contingent on the rms going concern value is im-
possible to write. This stems from the idea that it is much more di¢ cult to
describe (ex-ante) all scenarios for long-term investments compared to short-
term ones. Therefore, E is not able to o¤er I a complete contract contingent
on the rms total value. As we discuss in Section 5, if this were possible,
the problem of EM would not exist. Thus, we assume that E can only o¤er
a complete contract contingent on rst-period earnings r, and that E (the
party in control) can capture the rms going concern value (similar to Hart,
1988). E remains in control when the rm does not default. This leads to
the following security design in the model which depends on the rst-period
sharing rule and the contingencies for shifting control in the second period.7
Equity nancing (denote this strategy by s). In this case, I gets a fraction
k of the rms earnings in the rst period, 0 < k  1. Es payo¤ is (1 k)r+v
and Is payo¤ is kr.
Debt (denote this strategy by d). The rm issues debt with face value D
which matures at t = 1. If r < D (default), I gets the rst-period earnings
and the rms going concern value. E gets nothing. If r  D, Es rst-period
will be a¤ected by this change. The specic value is chosen arbitrarily although it assures
that the going-concern value of the rm is large enough compared to current earnings.
6The cost of EM includes mostly the time E spends on creating the "technology" for
EM (like creating a special purpose vehicle (rm) to hide losses in the case of Enron).
This is not necessarily linked to the magnitude of EM. The model can be generalized by
allowing di¤erent cost functions.
7In Section 5 we discuss di¤erent security designs.
6
earnings are r D. He also obtains the rms going concern value. Therefore,
Es total payo¤ is r  D + v and Is total payo¤ is D.
The game is as follows:
1. Securities are issued and sold for an amount b. The investment is
made.
2. E chooses e.
3. r0 is realized. E chooses a.
4. r and v become known. The parties get their payo¤s according to the
securities issued.
When choosing which securities to issue, E maximizes the expected value
of his net earnings (payo¤ on the securities minus the cost of e¤ort). On
the one hand, the contracts should provide E with the optimal incentive to
choose e and a. On the other hand, the expected value of Is payo¤ must
cover the investment cost, b, in order for I to accept the contract.
3 Optimal contracting without earnings ma-
nipulation.
Consider an optimal contract when E does not manipulate earnings under
any circumstance. This may be the case when the government puts in place
a well developed system of corporate control which makes it highly probable
that EM will be discovered. If the penalties for manipulating earnings are
very high, E cannot justify taking the risk. Es problem can be written as
follows (problem P1).
maxs;dEVE subject to
e = argmaxeEVE
0  e  1
EVI  b
where VE and VI denote the payo¤s of E and I respectively.
To solve P1 we will decompose it into two sub-problems. We rst con-
sider each nancing strategy separately and will summarize the results in
Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. 1) if b > 1=8, s is not feasible; 2) If b  1=8 and s is chosen,
k =
1 p1  8b
2
(3)
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Proof. If s was chosen, EVE = E[(1  k)r + 2  e2] = (1  k)e + 2  e2.
Hence the optimal level of e¤ort is
e = (1  k)=2 (4)
This is below the rst-best level of e¤ort: E gets only a fraction of the rms
prot but absorbs all the costs. Is expected payo¤ is
EVI = E[kr] = ke = k(1  k)=2 (5)
The optimal k maximizes Es expected payo¤, EVE, under the condition that
EVI is not less than b. From (4) we get:
EVE = (1  k)2=4 + 2 (6)
From (5), Is payo¤ is maximized when k = 1=2 which implies that maximal
possible EVI is equal to 1=8. Thus, strategy s is feasible only if b  1=8.
Since from (6), Es payo¤ is decreasing in k, the optimal k can be found by
equalizing (5) and b which produces (3). End proof.
Intuitively, if b is too large, the fraction of equity that must be given
to I is large enough to prevent E from providing an e¤ort level which will
generate enough income to compensate I.
Now consider d.
Lemma 2. 1) If b > 1, d is not feasible; 2) if b  1 and d is chosen
D = b (7)
Proof. Es choice of e maximizes EVE, where VE = r0   D + 2   e2, if
r0 = 1 and VE = 0 otherwise. Thus, EVE = e(3 D) e2. The maximand of
this expression is e0 = 3 D
2
. However, since D  1 (otherwise E gets nothing)
we have e0 > 1 which implies e = 1. Is payo¤ is D. Therefore, D = b is
optimal. This only works if 1  b. If 1 < b and D  1, Is payo¤ is not
su¢ cient to cover the initial investment. If D > 1, E provides no e¤ort since
he gets a payo¤ of zero and thus I gets nothing. End proof.
An explanation for Lemma 2 is as follows. If b is larger than the maximal
rst-period earnings, setting the debt face value below that maximal level
of earnings is not su¢ cient to ensure that the investor is repaid at least
b. If debt face value is higher than the maximal rst-period earnings, the
entrepreneur has nothing to gain and does not provide any e¤ort.
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Proposition 1. 1) If b  1=8, s is the optimal strategy. 2) If 1=8 < b 
1, d is optimal; 3) if 1 < b, the project will not be undertaken.
Proof. From Lemma 1, if s is chosen, b  1=8 and Es expected payo¤ is
EVE =
17 +
p
1  8b  4b
8
(8)
If d is chosen, b  1 and
EVE = 2  b (9)
Proposition 1 follows from comparing (8)-(9) for di¤erent values of b. End
proof.
The project will be undertaken if and only if b < 1. Thus, there is less
ine¢ ciency under small values of b than under high values of b. Given that
Es portion of total prot increases, E will provide a greater e¤ort when b is
lower. Also, note that Innes (1990) analyzes a similar environment (where an
entrepreneurs e¤ort is costly and EM is not allowed) with only one period
(in terms of our model this means v = 0) and demonstrates that debt is the
best nancing.
4 Optimal contracting with earnings manip-
ulation.
Now suppose that E can manipulate earnings. Es problem (P2) can be
written as follows:
maxs;dEVE subject to
a = argmaxa VE
e = argmaxeEVE
EVI  b
0  e  1
c  2  a  r0
As in the previous section, we begin by considering each nancing strategy
separately.
Lemma 3. 1) s is feasible if and only if b  1=8 and
1 p1  8b
2
< c (10)
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2) if s is chosen, k is determined by (3).
Proof. Consider strategy s. Given the intermediate prot r0 and action
a, Es payo¤ is:
(1  k)r0 + 2; if a = 0 (11)
(1  k)(r0   a) + 2 + a  c; if a 6= 0 (12)
Let  be the di¤erence between (11) and (12). We have  = c   ka. If
r0 = 0, then, from (1), a  0. Thus  > 0 and a = 0 is optimal. E will
not increase current earnings since he receives the rms total going concern
value and only a part of the rms current earnings. If r0 = 1, then, from (1),
a  1. (12) is maximized when a = r0 and it equals 3  c. Also (11) equals
3 k. Thus, if k < c, a = 0 is optimal. If k > c, the optimal a = r0 (when the
cost of EM is relatively low, E will increase the rms going concern value).
(If E is indi¤erent between a = 0 and a = r0, he choses a = 0. It happens if
k = c)
If strategy s is chosen, Is payo¤ is kr. If k > c, then it follows from the
above paragrath that Is payo¤ is 0 (this cannot be an equilibrium outcome).
If
k < c (13)
E does not manupulate earnings regardless r0. Es payo¤ thus is e(3  k) +
(1  e)2  e2 (i.e. with probability e, r0 = 1 and E gets (1  k)r0+2 = 3  k
and with probability 1   e, r0 = 0 and E gets 2). Es payo¤ is maximized
when e = (1 k)=2. Analogously to Lemma 1, we nd that this only works if
b  1=8 and the optimal k is given by (3). From (3) and (13), this contract
only works if the condition (10) holds. End proof.
If s is chosen, E always chooses a = 0. The payo¤s are the same as
those in the case without intertemporal substitution except for the condition
(10) which requires that the cost of EM is relatively high. Otherwise, E will
reduce current earnings and increase the rms going concern value.
Lemma 4. Consider strategy d. Let c  1. 1) If 2   c=2 < b, D = K,
where
K =
5  c p17 + c2   2c  8b
2
(14)
2) If 2   c=2 > b > 2   c, D = 2   c. 3) If 2   c > b, D = b. Now, let
c > 1. 1) If b > 2, d is not feasible; 2) If 2 > b > 1 + c=2, D = K; 3) if
1 + c=2 > b, D = 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
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The main result of Lemma 4 is that, in contrast to Lemma 2, debt -
nancing is possible even when b is relatively high. Without EM, a high b
would lead to a high debt face value which destroys Es incentive to provide
productive e¤ort. With the possibility of EM, E can make prot even if the
debt face value is large and current earnings are low.
To illustrate the proof of Lemma 4, consider the case c < 1 and b > 2  c.
Given the intermediate prot r0 and action a, Es payo¤ is:
0; if r0   a < D
r0  D + 2; if r0   a  D and a = 0 (15)
r0  D + 2  c; if r0   a  D and a 6= 0
This means that if the rm defaults on its debt, E gets nothing. Other-
wise, he gets the rms rst-period residual earnings plus the rms going-
concern value minus the cost of manipulation. If r0  D, a = 0 is optimal.
The same holds if r0 < D and 2 + r0   D   c < 0. Otherwise, the optimal
a satises a  r0   D and 2 + a   c  0. If these conditions are satised,
Es earnings remain the same regardless of a. Thus, for simplicity, we will
assume a = r0  D. Finally, we have:
a = 0 if either r0  D or r0 < D and 2 + r0  D   c < 0
a = r0  D, if r0 < D and 2 + r0  D   c  0 (16)
If interim earnings are above the threshold, the optimal strategy for E is
not to manipulate earnings. The same holds if bankruptcy is unavoidable
(debt is too large and current earnings are too low). Otherwise, the optimal
intertemporal substitution action is one that makes the rms rst-period
earnings just enough to cover the debt.
Three di¤erent situations are possible depending on the magnitude of D.
Consider
2 D   c  0 (17)
1 < D (18)
It will be shown that this case is never possible. The debt face value is
less than 2   c and less than the amount of investment b (recall that by
assumption b > 2   c) which makes this case counterintuitive. It needs to
be proven formally however, since I can get a large portion of the rms
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going concern value if the rm defaults in the rst period. By (16)-(18),
a = r0   D, 8r0. This means that E will manipulate earnings regardless
of r0 (the condition (18) implies that even if the rm performs well, the
interim earnings are below the debt face value; and (17) ensures that the
going-concern value is high enough to allow an increase rst-period earnings
to repay debt even if r0 = 0). The choice of e maximizes Es expected payo¤:
e(3 D  c) + (1  e)(2 D  c)  e2. Thus, e = 1=2. Is payo¤ is D. From
Is budget constraint and (17) we have: b  D  2   c. This leads to a
contradiction because b > 2  c.
Now consider the case 1  D (and 2 D   c > 0 because c < 1). Again
this case is counterintuitive becauseD < b. Here, the rm is solvent if r0 = 1,
and E can increase rst-period earnings to avoid bankruptcy if r0 = 0. The
choice of e maximizes e(3 D)+(1  e)(2 D  c)  e2. Thus, e = (1+ c)=2.
Is payo¤ is D. This does not work because b > 2 c > D (recall that c < 1).
Finally, consider
2  c D < 0 (19)
By (16) and (19) we have, a = r0   D if r0 = 1, and a = 0 if r0 = 0. The
choice of e maximizes
e(3 D   c)  e2 (20)
This means that, with probability e, E gets the current earnings of 0 and
the rms going concern value 2 reduced by the amount of EM (D   1) and
the cost of EM. The maximand of (20) is e00 = (3 D   c)=2. Thus,
e = e00 if 3 D   c  0 (21)
e = 0 if 3 D   c < 0
(Note that e00 < 1 because 2 > 3 D   c). Is expected payo¤ is
EVI = (3 D   c)D=2 + ( 1 +D + c) (22)
This means that debtholders receive D (when r0 = 1) with probability e00
and they receive the rms going concern value 2 with probability 1   e00 =
( 1+D+ c)=2 (when r0 = 0). From (20), Es payo¤ is (3 D  c)2=4 which
decreases in D. Thus, the optimal D is the minimal one which makes (22)
equal to at least b under conditions (19) and (21). Solving this optimization
problem we get the following (note that (14) denotes the minimal value of
D, which makes (22) equal to b). If 2   c=2  b, D = K. If 2   c=2 > b,
D = 2  c.
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It follows from Lemma 4 that if b is relatively low (b < 2   c) and the
cost of EM is relatively low (c < 1), debt is risk-free (D = b). The face
value of debt is low and E is able to manipulate earnings to attain the
threshold to avoid bankruptcy. If b is relatively large (b > 2) and the cost
of EM is relatively high (c > 1), debt is not feasible (EM is not possible).
Otherwise, E delivers some reasonable level of e¤ort which implies some
positive probability of default making debt risky. Lemmas 3 and 4 lead to
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If b  1=8, s is optimal if c > 1 
p
1 8b
2
and d is optimal
if c  1 
p
1 8b
2
. If 1=8 < b  2, d is optimal. If b > 2, d is optimal if c  1;
and the project will not be undertaken if c > 1.
Proof. Consider b  1=8. Suppose c > 1. If s is chosen, Es payo¤ is
17+
p
1 8b 4b
8
by (8) and Lemma 3. If d is chosen, Es payo¤is (2 c)2=4 (see the
proof of Lemma 4). The former is not less than 33=16 (this value is attained
when b = 1=8) and the latter is not greater than 1=2 (this value is attained
when c = 0). Thus, s is optimal. Consider 1 
p
1 8b
2
< c  1. If s is chosen,
Es payo¤ is 17+
p
1 8b 4b
8
. If d is chosen, Es payo¤ is 9=4   b   c=2 + c2=4.
Again, the payo¤ from s is higher. To see this, note that the payo¤ from d
decreases in c. When c = 1 
p
1 8b
2
, the payo¤ from s is still larger. Thus, it
is also larger under other values of c. Consider 1 
p
1 8b
2
 c. s is not feasible.
d is feasible and thus is optimal.
Consider 1=8 < b  2. s is not feasible. d is feasible and thus is optimal.
Consider 2 < b. s is not feasible. If c > 1, no contract is feasible. If
c  1, d is feasible and thus is optimal. End proof.
Proposition 2 is intuitive. First, if b is large, s is not feasible - as discussed
in the case without EM. Thus, debt is the optimal nancing choice if the
cost of EM is low. For other values of b, we have the following. A low
c is detrimental to s because it creates opportunities for E to engage in
EM, thereby shifting the rms value away from Is pockets. d is almost
always accompanied by EM, so reducing the cost of EM is benecial for debt
nancing.
Corollary 1 considers the e¤ect of changes in b on the optimal choice
of contract. It is shown that when c is relatively small, rms with a high
b issue debt while rms with the same c but a low b issue equity. If b is
relatively small, E will nance the project by issuing stock. The rms going
concern value will fully cover the investors investment. The entrepreneur
will keep 100% of current period earnings which will mitigate the moral
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hazard problem. If b is large, then nancing in this way may not be feasible.
Therefore, debt becomes optimal.
Corollary 1. If 1 
p
1 8b
2
 c, d is optimal. If 1 
p
1 8b
2
< c  1, s is
optimal if b  1=8, and d is optimal if b > 1=8. If c > 1, s is optimal if
b  1=8, d is optimal if 1=8 < b  2, and no contract is feasible if b > 2.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2.
Corollary 2. Earnings manipulation can appear in equilibrium. Earn-
ings manipulation is more probable as c decreases and b increases.
Proof. From Proposition 2, if, for instance, c < 1 and b > 2  c, the equi-
librium outcome is nancing by debt and, if r0 = 1, the rm will manipulate
earnings. Also, from Proposition 2, for a given b, debt nancing is optimal
when c is relatively low. In most cases, debt nancing, in contrast to equity
nancing, will be accompanied by earnings manipulation (see the proof of
Lemma 4). From Corollary 1, the same holds for high values of b. End proof.
5 Can earnings manipulation enhance a rms
value?
Now we compare rms that are involved in EM (Section 4) with those that
are not (Section 3). If the amount of investment is large (b > 1), a rm
that does not manipulate earnings will not undertake projects with positive
value. In contrast, a rm that manipulates earnings will undertake the same
projects. If the amount of investment is low and EM is not possible, nancing
with equity is optimal. If a rm can manipulate earnings, equity may still be
optimal. However, the cost of EM must be high - otherwise the entrepreneur
will "convert" current earnings into ine¢ cient long-term projects making the
issuance of equity unfeasible (ex-ante). In the latter case, debt becomes
optimal. This will usually be accompanied by EM: the entrepreneur will
try to achieve the threshold to avoid bankruptcy. It follows that there is
a trade-o¤ in social e¢ ciency between the benets from EM improving the
entrepreneurs e¤ort and the costs of EM.
Proposition 3. If 1 < b  2, rms that manipulate earnings have a
higher value than rms that do not :Otherwise, rms that manipulate earnings
have a higher value if and only if the cost of manipulation is low.
Proof. Let VEM denote the value of rms that can manipulate earnings
and let VN denote the value of rms that cannot manipulate earnings. As
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follows from Proposition 1, if b > 1 and earnings manipulation is not allowed,
the rm does not invest and thus VN = 0. According to Proposition 2, if
1 < b  2 or if b > 2 and c < 1, rms that can engage in EM will use
debt nancing and invest in the project. The value of these rms will be
positive. Consider 1=8 < b  1. According to Proposition 1, VN = 2  b. If
c  1, VEM = 9=4   b   c=2 + c2=4 (from the proof of Proposition 2). This
expression decreases in c when c  1. The minimal value, 2  b, is attained
when c = 1. Therefore, the value of rms that can engage in EM is greater
than or equal to the value of rms that are not involved in EM. If c > 1,
VEM = (2   c)2=4. This is less than 2   b. Therefore, rms that do not
manipulate earnings have a higher value. If 1=8  b, VN = 17+
p
1 8b 4b
8
. If
c > 1 
p
1 8b
2
, rms that manipulate earnings have the same value as rms that
do not. If c  1 
p
1 8b
2
, VEM = 9=4 b c=2+c2=4. Consider  = VEM VN .
This expression decreases in c. When c = 0,  > 0. When c = 1 
p
1 8b
2
,
 < 0. The proposition follows from the continuity of  in c. End proof.
6 Model discussion.
1. Suppose that it is possible to write an enforceable contract contingent on
the rms total value. Then, for any contract found in section 4 there exists
an alternative contract contingent on the rms total value that will provide
E with a higher payo¤. To illustrate this, consider c < 1 and b < 2   c.
If a rm can engage in EM, the optimal contract is analogous to the one
described in proposition 2. Es e¤ort is e = 1=2 and the parties expected
payo¤s are:
EVE = 9=4  b  c (23)
and EVI = b. D = b is optimal. E manipulates earnings regardless of r0.
When r0 = 0 he receives 2  b  c and when r0 = 1 he receives 3  b  c. Now
suppose the parties write a contract where E gets 2   b if the rms total
value is 2 or less and 3   b if the rms total value is greater than 2. The
optimal e¤ort maximizes Es expected payo¤ e(3  b) + (1  e)(2  b)  e2.
e = 1=2 is optimal. Also, a = 0 because any a > 0 will only reduce the rms
total value. Es expected payo¤ is 9=4   b which is greater than (23). Is
expected payo¤ is 1=2(3  (3  b))+1=2(2  (2  b)) = b. Therefore, we have
a better contract which does not involve EM.
2. Now suppose that the model does not contain productive e¤ort. In
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this case, equity is the optimal nancing contract since it eliminates the
intertemporal substitution problem (this idea is developed in Jensen, 2003).
Other securities will be useless. This scenario is not realistic since rms do
not issue equity alone.
3. Suppose that the rm can issue convertible debt. This is similar to
standard debt described in the model except that I can purchase a fraction of
the rms shares when it is solvent. However, since E remains in control, he
will cream-o¤ the rms going concern value. Hence, the modelling is similar
to standard debt.
4. Long-term debt is not considered (in the spirit of incomplete contract
literature) because it cannot be enforced. Since the creditors do not have
property rights on the remaining assets, the owners will capture the rms
entire going-concern value.
5. One can make additional assumptions about the rst and second period
sharing rules based on a continuous earnings distribution function or di¤erent
control shifting scenarios. These scenarios may yield some new results. For
instance, one can assume thatE also has some private benets (in the spirit of
the property rights approach). However, the main idea that EM can improve
productive e¤ort will not be a¤ected.
7 Empirical evidence and policy implications.
1. We have shown that EM can be a part of the equilibrium relationship
between rmsinsiders and outsiders. This holds even if the cost of EM is
relatively high (as follows from Proposition 2). Investors accept some degree
of EM because this increases the insidersincentive to provide a high level
productive e¤ort.
2. From Proposition 3, if the cost of EM is relatively low, EM can be
socially e¢ cient. EM can enhance a rms value when compared to the case
without EM. If the cost of EM is relatively high, the opportunity to engage
in EM either does not a¤ect rms values (when they do not use EM in
equilibrium) or is detrimental to rmsvalues (when rms engage in EM in
equilibrium).
3. EM should more frequently be observed in industries characterized by
incomplete contracts. If complete contracts can be written, the parties can
write a contract contingent on the rms overall earnings which eliminates
the possibility of EM. Thus, rms in industries which are characterized by a
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high degree of technological or market uncertainty (such as software, internet,
biomedical etc.) are more likely to be engaged in EM.
4. As implied by Corollary 2, EM should more frequently be observed
among less protable rms (high b). This prediction is consistent with
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997).
5. Firms which manipulate earnings issue more debt (Lemmas 3 and 4).
This is consistent with Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002) and Hodgson and
Stevenson (2000) where rms which have excessive debt are more likely to
be involved in EM.
6. It follows from Corollary 1 that rms with a higher b (and lower prof-
itability respectively) issue debt more often than rms with a lower b. This
is consistent with a very important corporate nance phenomenon: the neg-
ative correlation between debt and protability (see, among others, Titman
and Wessels (1988), and Rajan and Zingales (2000)).
Since EM can be socially e¢ cient, the question of its regulation depends
on the industry and any parameters related to the rms projects. If the
cost of EM is relatively low, putting in place an expensive public system
of EM prevention cannot be e¢ cient: entrepreneurs will invest less funds
in socially e¢ cient projects and will not provide high levels of productive
e¤ort. According to our analysis (proof of Proposition 3), such a system
should target average-prot rms (when the cost of EM is relatively high) or
high-prot rms (when the cost of EM is in the intermediate range).
8 Conclusion.
This paper analyzes a model where an entrepreneur needs external nancing
for a protable investment project and his productive e¤ort is not observable
by outsiders. The security design should provide the entrepreneur with the
optimal incentive to provide productive e¤ort. We have a standard moral
hazard problem when the entrepreneur is not able to manipulate earnings.
The equilibrium level of e¤ort is below the socially optimal level and in some
cases (if the amount of investment is relatively large), the entrepreneur will
not invest in socially e¢ cient projects. Following this, we analyze the case
where the entrepreneur is also able to manipulate earnings. More speci-
cally, the entrepreneur can transfer cash ow between periods. Our main
nding is that the existence of EM can lead to increased output (including
the entrepreneurs e¤ort and the amount of investment) and therefore im-
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proved social e¢ ciency. It is also shown that EM should more frequently
be observed among rms with low protability, low costs of EM, and exten-
sive debt nancing. The main policy implication is that putting in place an
expensive system to prevent EM may be socially ine¢ cient.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose c < 1. First, consider the choices of a and e.
Three situations are possible. Consider
2  c  D > 1
By (15), in this case a = r0  D, 8r0. E chooses the e which maximizes his
expected payo¤: e(3 D   c) + (1  e)(2 D   c)  e2. Thus, e = 1=2 and
EVI = D: (24)
Now consider
2 D   c < 0 (25)
Again by (15), a = D   1 if r0 = 1 and a = 0 if r0 = 0. The choice of e
maximizes e(3 D   c)  e2. The maximand of (20) is e00 = (3 D   c)=2.
Thus,
e = e00 if 3 D   c > 0 (26)
e = 0 if 3 D   c  0
(Note that e00 < 1 because 2 > 3 D   c). The case e = 0 is not interesting
because Es payo¤ is 0 and thus debt is never the optimal contract. In the
rst case, Is payo¤ is
(3 D   c)D=2 + ( 1 +D + c) (27)
EVE = (3 D   c)2=4 (28)
If 1  D (and 2 D  c > 0 because c < 1), by (15), a = D if r0 = 0 and
a = 0 if r0 = 1. The choice of e maximizes e(3 D)+ (1  e)(2 D  c)  e2.
Thus, e = (1 + c)=2. Therefore,
EVI = D: (29)
Now we turn to the analysis of the choice of optimal contract. The case
b > 2  c was described in the text.
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Consider the case 1 < b < 2   c. For the case 2   c  D > 1, by (24),
D = b is optimal. Es expected payo¤ is
EVE = 9=4  b  c (30)
Consider the case
2 D   c < 0 (31)
Since EVE decreases in D by (28), the optimal D is the minimal one that
makes (27) at least equal to b. Taking into account (31) and (26) we get
D = 2  c. (Note that when b < 2  c, K < 2  c which makes the constraint
(31) binding). Therefore,
EVE = 1=4 (32)
The case 1  D does not work because b > 1  D = EVI . The latter
inequality follows from (29).
Finally, for the case 2   c > b > 1, we have the following. There are
two candidates for the optimal contract. One contract (with D = b) implies
earnings manipulation regardless of r0 and the other implies earnings manip-
ulation when r0 = 1 (with D = 2  c). Comparing (30) and (32) shows that
a higher output is produced when D = b.
Now consider b < 1. For the case 2   c  D > 1, Es objective function
is not binding. The optimal level of debt is D = 1 + ", where " should be
as small as possible, " > 0 (it cannot be equal 0 since D > 1). Es payo¤ is
5=4  "  c. In the limit (when "! 0) it equals
5=4  c (33)
For the case
2 D   c < 0
D = 2  c is optimal.
EVE = 1=4 (34)
For the case 1  D, D = b is optimal.
EVE = 9=4  b  c=2 + c2=4 (35)
Comparing (33), (34), and (35) we nd that if b < 1, D = b is optimal.
Es payo¤ is 9=4  b  c=2 + c2=4.
Now suppose c > 1. First, we analyze the choices of a and e.
19
If 1 D < 0, by (15), a = D  1 if r0 = 1 and a = 0 if r0 = 0. The choice
of e maximizes e(3 D   c)  e2. Thus, e = (3 D   c)=2 if 3 D   c  0
and 0 otherwise. The latter case is not interesting because Es payo¤ is 0
and thus debt is never the optimal contract. In the former case, Is payo¤ is
(3 D   c)D=2 + ( 1 +D + c) (36)
EVE = (3 D   c)2=4 (37)
If 2 D  c > 0, by (15), a = D if r0 = 0 and a = 0 if r0 = 1. The choice
of e maximizes e(3   D) + (1   e)(2   D   c)   e2. Thus, e = (1 + c)=2.
Therefore, Is payo¤ is D.
If 1 > D and 2 D c < 0 (no EM), the choice of emaximizes e(3 D) e2.
Thus, e = 1 because 1 D > 0. Therefore, Is payo¤ is D.
We now turn to the analysis of optimal contracts.
Consider b > 2. The case 1  D < 0 is not feasible because EVI < b for
any D > 1. The case 2 D  c > 0 is not feasible either. This works only if
b < 2  c.
If 1 > D and 2 D   c < 0 (no EM), Is payo¤ is D. D = b is optimal.
This holds only if b < 1.
Therefore, for the case b > 2, debt is not feasible.
Now consider 2 > b.
If 1 D < 0, then if 0 < 2 + c  2b, D = 1 is optimal. This implies that
EVE = (2   c)2=4. If 0 > 2 + c   2b, D = K is optimal. This implies that
EVE = L, where
L =
(1  c+p17 + c2   2c  8b)2
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The case 2 D   c > 0 works only if b < 2  c.
The case 1 > D and 2 D   c < 0 (no EM) works only if b < 1.
Therefore, for the case 2 > b we have the following. If 0 < 2 + c   2b,
D = 1 is optimal. This implies that EVE = (2   c)2=4. If 0 > 2 + c   2b,
D = K is optimal. This implies that EVE = L. End proof.
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